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Abstract
In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze’s concept of the
virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the
problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits
from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus’ critique of Aristotelian or
hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to
Deleuze’s account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus
in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to
explicate Deleuze’s dialectics or theory of Ideas, his approach to the
principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself.
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I. Introduction
The philosophical thread uniting the work of Duns Scotus and Gilles
Deleuze is, more than a shared commitment to the ontological doctrine
of univocity, a rigorous pursuit of a metaphysics of individuation,
exploring the consequences of a fundamental insight: that what exists
prior to individuation or differentiation, which is figured variously as
the ‘common nature’ and the ‘virtual’, is not at all undifferentiated.1
This is an important insight because it forces a re-evaluation of the
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idea of possibility, which was classically understood as the negation
of actuality, as in Aristotelian metaphysics. Hegel’s famous critique,
that Schelling’s philosophy of Indifferenz amounted to the ‘night where
all cows are black’, exposes the poverty of such a conception, by
means of which we ultimately are left incapable of accounting for
the reality of actual individuals or distinguishing between empirical
instances (Hegel 2004: 9). Deleuze’s metaphysics, with its emphatic
insistence on the category of the virtual, means to eliminate entirely
the idea of possibility as a kind of transcendental illusion: in fact,
for Deleuze, as a thoroughgoing Spinozist, nothing is possible (Peden
2014: 227–36; Zourabichvili 1998).2 The positive notion of common
nature or virtuality, as something both completely determined and
undifferentiated, far exceeds in its explanatory capacities a negative
notion of possibility as purely indifferent.3 But in order to think this
pre-individual nature, to pose philosophically the problem of genesis,
as Scotus already demonstrates and as we will see, it is necessary to
abandon hylomorphism, the metaphysical theory according to which
entities are understood as a combination of matter and form.
Why do we say ‘individuation or differentiation’? We mean this
not in the sense of an alternative but in the sense of a Spinozist
Deus sive Natura – that is, as a polemical formulation indicating an
inclusive disjunction.4 To the extent that one thinks the individual
under the aspect of identity, one might conclude that individuation and
differentiation are opposed. However, the individual is precisely distinct
insofar as it is not identical to other individuals, although the positive
account of in what this nonidentity consists may remain obscure. For this
reason, Scotus is already able to develop a concept of singularity whose
fundamental character is its irreducibility or uniqueness with respect to
what is common – and which is opposed to a concept of individuality
whose fundamental character is its indifferent participation in relation
to a universal. Moreover, this peculiar coincidence of irreducibility
and commonness in actual singularity cannot be conceived in terms of
negation, but only by reference to the positivity of a difference. In other
words, the process by which differentiation unfolds is precisely that of
the genesis of individuals.
In what follows, we will first assess Scotus’ critique of the conceptual
inadequacy of Aristotelian hylomorphism regarding the issue of
individuation: neither form, matter, nor their relationship can provide a
convincing account of what constitutes an individual. Scotus’ exhaustive
negative-critical analysis yields the positive result that some minimal
immanent criteria are ascertained regarding the problem of individuation
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and the concept of common nature. Subsequently we will turn to
Deleuze, and in particular to his interpretation of differential calculus,
since it is here that he identifies substantial resources for thinking
the process of differentiation, which he articulated in terms of the
actualisation of a problematic Idea (his theory of dialectics). Thus we
will ask: why does Deleuze turn to the calculus, and what is at stake in
his interpretation of it? For although Deleuze’s reference to the calculus
does not commit him to a mathematical ontology à la Badiou, he
nevertheless clearly insists that neither is it to be understood as a mere
metaphor.5 Instead, the metaphysics of differential calculus provides a
model for grasping how, according to Deleuze and following the insights
of Scotus, the pre-individual real is completely determined in a way that
is obscure (rather than clear) and distinct.
II. Scotus and the Immanent Critique of Individuation
The medieval philosopher and theologian Duns Scotus asks: how can
we account for individuality? To reformulate this question in such a
way that elucidates the intimate connection between individuation and
differentiation, we might say: how is a specific difference – the difference
that distinguishes the essence of one species from that of another within
the same genus or generic difference – itself differentiated into individuals
of that species? To answer this question, the Aristotelian framework
that formed the conceptual and metaphysical basis for much of the
scholastic tradition would prove inadequate. Scotus’ exhaustive method
shows that none of the received categories could possibly account for
this differentiation of specific differences, and thus that this problematic
of individuation requires the development and deployment of new
categories entirely: no longer the universal, but the common; no longer
the individual, but the singular. Let us follow his path and join in the
exhaustion, seeking the point at which there are no more possibilities;
from this vantage point, significant characteristics of the common nature
will become apparent.
In Ordinatio II, Distinction 3, Part I, sometimes referred to as the
Treatise on the Common Nature and Individuation, Scotus takes up
this problem, rejecting in turn the following suggestions for what could
count as a principium individuationis: 1. that things are individual by
virtue of their nature (question 1); 2. that things are individual by
virtue of a double negation (question 2); 3. that things are individual
by virtue of their act of existing (question 3); 4. that things are
individual by virtue of their accidents, in particular their quantity
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(question 4); and 5. that things are individual by virtue of their matter
(question 5). The first two rejections establish the coordinates within
which the rest of his investigation proceeds: they make it clear that
our principle must be something positive which is distinct from the
individual’s specific difference. The subsequent questions, all answered
in the negative, serve to demonstrate the inadequacy of the accounts
of his predecessors and interlocutors, insofar as they seek to locate the
principle of individuation in the already existing individual (3), some
one of its accidental qualities (4), or in the inadequate hylomorphic
concept of matter (5). In his critique of the possibility that matter can
suffice to account for individuation, Scotus was motivated by a peculiar
theological concern: for if matter individuated, it would be impossible
that angels, which are supposed to be immaterial beings, could be
distinct from one another, whereas there are scriptural references to
multiple angels. But the consequences of his critique extend well beyond
this esoteric interest.
1. The first possibility, that a thing is individual by virtue of its
very nature, or ‘from itself’, is the position Scotus attributes to Roger
Marston.6 This would mean that the very nature of a thing, or its
specific difference, is that by virtue of which there are individuals of
that species. However, this leads to the problematic contention that
the nature of ‘stoneness’ is what accounts for the individual differences
between this and that stone, whereas it seems clear that what two things
have in common cannot be that by which they are distinguished from
one another.7 Scotus argues that ‘there is some real unity in the thing
that is less-than-numerical unity or the proper unity of the singular.
This unity belongs to the nature in itself’ (Scotus 1987: Ordinatio II,
Distinction 3, Part 1, Question 1, §30).8 In other words, that which
is held in common is real, but its unity is ‘less-than-numerical’ insofar
as it is insufficient on its own terms to constitute any this – it does not
individuate on its own.
This common nature, as less-than-numerical, is nevertheless not
incompatible with either universality, or else we would not be able to
talk about what it is to be a stone, nor with individuality, since there
are indeed individual stones.9 Consider that when we say, ‘these two are
both stones’, we mean at once that ‘these two are both stones’, or really
have something in common; and at the same time that ‘these two are
both stones’, that is, they are nevertheless distinct from one another,
or they are individuals. Universality and individuality, therefore, are
both compatible with the nature insofar as it is common, but insofar
as it is less-than-numerical it is neither universal nor individual on its
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own: ‘although [the nature] never really exists without some of these
[features], nevertheless of itself it is not any of them. Rather, [the nature]
is naturally prior to all of these [features]’ (Scotus 1987: Q1 §32). The
common nature is neither universal nor particular, neither singular nor
plural; rather, it is prior to and compatible with receiving any of these
determinations.
Scotus argues that we must be careful not to think that the nature
is common insofar as we understand it, and singular insofar as it
‘really is’ out there in the world, which would simply repeat the
nominalist position. This is inadequate because common natures are not
abstractions:
Commonness is suitable to the nature outside the intellect, and likewise
singularity: commonness is suitable to the nature from itself, while singularity
is suitable to the nature through something in the nature that contracts [the
nature]. But universality is not suitable to the thing from itself. And so I grant
that a cause of universality should be looked for, [as maintained in n.6].
Nevertheless, no cause of commonness other than the nature itself need be
looked for. Once commonness is postulated in the nature itself according to
its proper beingness and unity, one must necessarily look for the cause of
singularity, which adds something more to the nature to which it belongs.
(Scotus 1987: Q1 §32)
Scotus recognises, on the one hand, that insofar as we agree that
something is held in common between individuals, it must be something
real. But, on the other hand, and against the (Platonic) realists, he holds
that it is in fact singulars which are ‘ultimately actual’, since only they,
and not abstract universals, have numeric unity; this numeric unity is the
‘something more’ they add to the common nature. Hence when we say
that the common nature has ‘less-than-numeric unity’, as Paolo Virno
argues, this amounts to a ‘realism of the Common and a nominalism
of the Universal’ (Virno 2009: 62). Now, based on this formulation of
the common nature, we will need to ask the question of individuation
anew: what is it that, as he puts it, ‘contracts’ (contrahens) the nature to
individuality?
2. Scotus moves immediately to argue that this contracting factor must
be something positive, contra Henry of Ghent, for whom individuation
is the result of a twofold negation. According to the latter, an individual
is not its species, and it is not any other individual of its species. On
this account, ‘since “singularity” or “individuality” can only mean a
double negation, it is not necessary to seek something positive as its
cause, for the negation is sufficient’ (Scotus 1987: Q2 §44). However,
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Scotus asks, what do we mean when we say that something is an
individual? We mean, above all else, that it cannot be divided into
subjective parts: ‘[there is something] to which being divided into many
parts of which any given one is that thing is formally incompatible’
(Scotus 1987: Q2 §48). While the species ‘human’ may be divided into
members of that species, an individual human cannot be divided in this
way without being destroyed. As Timothy B. Noone writes, for Scotus
‘instantiability is contradictory with the notion of individuality as such’
(Noone 2003: 114). The question is, by virtue of what is an individual
incompatible with being divided? And as Scotus argues, the answer
cannot be a negation or privation, but must be something positive:
‘nothing is simply incompatible with some being through a privation
in it alone, but rather through something positive in it’ (Scotus 1987:
Q2 §49). Or again: ‘No imperfection is formally incompatibility with
something except through some perfection’10 (Scotus 1987: Q2 §52).
Individuality, or incompatibility with being divided, is in fact a positive
feature of things, and thus cannot be explained by means of negation
alone.
But even more directly, Scotus argues that this attempt in fact begs
the question: ‘I ask whence a negation is a this, since it is of the same
account in this [singular] and in that one’ (Scotus 1987: Q2 §56). If
the question is: ‘by virtue of what is something a this?’ then to answer:
‘this negation’ is obviously insufficient and circular. Clearly, it is true
that individuals are not their species and not other individuals of that
species; but these negative relationships are secondary effects of that
which positively individuates them.11
3. In question 3, Scotus very quickly dismisses the idea that it is
the act of existing that individuates or contracts the common nature.
The suggestion is that whatever distinguishes something cannot be its
potential being, but its actuality; but existing is ‘the ultimate act of
individuals’, compared with which everything else about them is merely
possible; and thus this very act of existing, esse existentiae, is that
which distinguishes or individuates the common nature (Scotus 1987:
Q3 §60). Scotus objects to this, first, that whatever distinguishes or
determines individuals must itself be distinct and determinate, but ‘the
act of existing’ is neither of these things; in fact, ‘that it exists’ seems
to be about as indeterminate a claim as can be made about something
(Scotus 1987: Q3 §§61–2). And second, he repeats the argument from
§56 above, since ‘it can be asked through what the existence is a this’
(Scotus 1987: Q3 §64). Simply put, ‘this existence’ is again circular and
insufficient as an answer to the question of what makes something a this.
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4. Scotus turns then to the position that it is matter, and material
quantity, that individuates. This seems minimally plausible as an account
of individuation given a hylomorphic model in which an individual’s
form is distinct from its matter: since ostensibly the formal cause
is identical in the case of two individuals – for example, universal
‘humanity’ would be the same for any two humans – then perhaps it is
the material cause, or the relationship between the form and its matter,
which provides the principle of individual difference. Scotus quotes
Boethius: ‘The variety of accidents produces difference in number, for
three men differ neither in species nor in genus, but in their accidents’
(Scotus 1987: Q4 §67). We can therefore also formulate this suggestion
as follows: two members of a species are the same in essence; but they
are not identical insofar as they are individuals with different accidental
qualities; thus it must be their accidental qualities that individuates them.
But Scotus argues that this attempt also fails, for the simple reason
that an individual substance is prior – by nature and by definition – to
its accidents, and it is absurd to argue that anything can cause what
precedes it: ‘no accident can per se be an account through which material
substance is individuated’ (Scotus 1987: Q4 §76). Thus, the lesson
here is that the principium individuationis cannot be found among any
individual’s accidental characteristics, and in particular the quantity
of material that an individual possesses falls unambiguously into this
category.
Moreover, if we understand by a substance something that is logically
prior to its accidents, then we must similarly reject the idea that it is the
composite of substance and its accidents which individuates the former,
since any such aggregate would itself have to be accidental (Noone 2003:
115). Simply on the basis of the logical priority of material substantial
individuality to its accidents, Scotus concludes that ‘it is impossible for
a substance to be individual through some accident’ (Scotus 1987: Q4
§111). We can also put this in the now-familiar terms of the charge of
circularity: we presuppose its being a this when we say that this quantity
of material can be that through which something is individuated (Scotus
1987: QQ5–6 §138).
Even the apparently more sophisticated suggestion, namely that the
individuating difference is the relationship between a thing’s form and
matter, fails for the same reason. Given that the form, ex hypothesi, is
identical in the case of two members of a species, the difference in the
relationships between their forms and the matter that together constitute
them will turn out to be nothing other than the difference in their matter.
For there are only two terms in this relationship, the form and the matter;
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and so if, when we compare two such composites, one of the terms is
identical in both, then the difference between these two composites will
be entirely dependent on the second term, in this case matter.12
5. But there is another way in which this hylomorphic approach
cannot account for individuation by material difference. In the third
question, Scotus did not object to the idea that individuals must be
distinguished by their actuality rather than by their potentiality; he
objected rather to the suggestion that the simple act of existence can
suffice to account for individuation. Indeed, given two things that are
actually identical but which could potentially be different, we have no
way to distinguish between them. But on the hylomorphic account,
matter is taken to be the principle of pure potentiality or dynamis. How,
then, would it be possible for a differential distribution of potentialities
to account for actual individuation? As Noone puts it, ‘positing matter
as the principle of individuation seems to entail locating the source
of the greatest unity (unitas maxima) and actuality in a principle that
is ordinarily the source of multiplicity and potentiality’ (Noone 2003:
117). For this reason, matter is not capable of furnishing us with a
principle of individuation: the pure capacity to receive a form cannot
be a positive factor that contracts a common nature into singularity.
This distinguishing or contracting positive factor cannot be an
essential, specific, or ‘quidditative’ distinction, since this would entail
a difference at the level of the common nature and not at the level of the
individual:
the singular is not definable by some definition other than the definition of the
species. The [singular] is nevertheless per se a being, adding some beingness to
the specific beingness. However, the per se beingness that [the singular] adds
[to the specific beingness] is not quidditative beingness. (Scotus 1987: QQ5–6
§192)
Thus there is no science of the singular. If we ask after the quidditative
being or essence of an individual, we must conclude that it is its specific
difference; however, it is also the case that the individual adds something
to the common nature that it contracts. As Virno argues, this yields
the surprising, even paradoxical conclusion that the individual is both
‘more’ and ‘less’ than the species: the individual adds something to the
common nature and, in contracting it, gives it the mode of ultimate
existence or actuality; however, the common nature is never exhausted
by the singular into which it is contracted (Virno 2009: 63–4). And one
immediate consequence of this analysis, as we suggested at the outset, is
that the common nature is not thinkable as indifferent, even though it
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is logically pre-individual. That is, the positive contracting factor is not
the only positivity at play in differentiation: the common nature, too, is
positive and determinate, although on its own it is neither singular nor
universal. This pre-individual determinacy is what Deleuze, in Difference
and Repetition, calls the ‘virtual’, and it is to his investigation that we
will now turn.
III. Deleuze and the Distinctness of the Virtual
The concept of the virtual occupies a vexing position in the reception
of Deleuze’s thought. On the one hand, it is quite obvious, at least in
Difference and Repetition, that the virtual plays a central role in his
metaphysics; on the other hand, any survey of the secondary literature
will more likely than not leave the reader confused as to what precisely
this role is. For instance, Žižek, in his monograph on Deleuze, writes
that we must be careful not to conflate it with the ‘virtual reality’ of
a digital world before attempting to reformulate it using his familiar
Lacanian vocabulary, in which he somewhat confusingly claims both
that it ‘as such is the Real’, but also that it is the ‘symbolic as such’
(Žižek 2012: 3–4). Moreover, he suggests that we understand by it a
kind of ‘quantum oscillation’, and that the virtual names an ineliminable
excess of becoming over being (Žižek 2012: 8–10, 21). On the other
hand, Badiou, in his own monograph Deleuze: The Clamor of Being,
argues that the virtual is the ‘name of Being’, ‘the very Being of beings’,
ultimately suggesting that the virtual is an idealist Platonic hangover in
Deleuze’s thought, the postulate of a transcendent One-All that results
from his inadequate reckoning with the implications of post-Cantorian
mathematics (Badiou 2000: 43, 48). Even more sympathetic readings
of Deleuze are often misleading and contradictory. Brian Massumi
claims that the virtual names the “‘real but abstract” incorporeality
of the body’ (Massumi 2002: 19–21), arguing that certain fashionable
forms of contemporary social critique are not abstract enough; he
tends to characterise it as a kind of total space of incompossible
and unliveable coexistences whose affective relation to the actual is,
apparently, the object of quantum physics.13 It seems difficult to accept
this characterisation of the virtual as ‘real but abstract’, given that
Deleuze cites Proust as having articulated its formula: the virtual is, he
says, ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’ (Deleuze
1994: 208).
For our part, we would like to suggest that it is within the context of
the problem of individuation, which we have been exploring in Duns
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Scotus, that the concept of the virtual gains its sense and becomes
intelligible. The theory of the virtual, as we will show, is Deleuze’s
response to the question of how and in what way the pre-individual
real, like Scotus’ common nature, is anything but indistinct. Rather
than the abyss of undifferentiated (in)difference, the virtual is completely
determined, in a way that is ‘distinct and obscure’.
Just as Scotus reached the postulate of a common nature essentially
prior to and compatible with both individuality and universality,
Deleuze argues that we can grasp the virtual only on condition that we
think it as pure past: ‘The virtual object is not a former present’, which
would be the thought of a relative past, a past thought only in relation
to the contracted present; rather, it is ‘the past as contemporaneous
with its own present, as pre-existing the passing present and as that
which causes the present to pass’ (Deleuze 1994: 101). The virtual is
thus what is ‘behind’ the actual, in two senses: it is behind logically and
temporally, as that which has been actualised; but moreover, it is what
is behind the contraction of the present, as what causes it. Indeed, the
contemporaneity of the virtual past in relation to the actual present is
a consequence of the former being the cause of the latter. Here already
at the level of language, we can begin to see the connection between the
problem of individuation in both Scotus and Deleuze: the virtual is that
by virtue of which the present is contracted into actual states populated
by distributions of individuals.
It is in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition, entitled ‘Ideal
Synthesis of Difference’, that Deleuze attempts to work out the logic of
this virtual contraction.14 Claiming to find in Kant a theory of Ideas as
being essentially problematic, and in this way objective, he argues that
they ‘present three moments: undetermined with regard to their objects,
determinable with regard to objects of experience, and having an ideal
of infinite determination with regard to concepts of the understanding’
(Deleuze 1994: 169). The plausibility of his theory of Ideas will turn
on whether or not he is able to demonstrate intrinsic and necessary
connections between these three modalities of determination, which are
the key moments of his theory of differentiation: the undetermined, the
determinable, and the completely or infinitely determined. In order to
elaborate these connections, he turns immediately to the differential
calculus and proposes a novel interpretation.
Now although he identifies Kant as the terminal point of a sequence
beginning with Plato and passing through Leibniz in the development
of the theory of Ideas, Deleuze’s own project clearly and radically
breaks from Kantian philosophy on this score. The inadequacy of
Individuation from Scotus to Deleuze 363
transcendental idealism, from Deleuze’s perspective, is most acutely
articulated in the early critiques of Salomon Maïmon in his Essay
on Transcendental Philosophy: it is necessary to pass from a theory
of extrinsic conditions to one of intrinsic genesis. From the point
of view of transcendental conditions alone, the relationship between
the determinable and the determined remains totally extrinsic: if the
condition for the possibility of any representation is the pure forms of
intuition, this tells us nothing about this representation – not only does
it tell us nothing about what it is in its particularity, but we have no way
of grasping why we have this one and not another.15 Deleuze considers
Kant’s introduction of the schematism to be evidence of this inadequacy,
through which ‘difference remains external and as such empirical and
impure, suspended outside the construction “between” the determinable
intuition and the determinant concept’ (Deleuze 1994: 173–4). Hence if
we are to develop a theory of individuation, it cannot be grounded upon
a system of extrinsic conditions. The theory of conditions is necessarily
formal, but the genetic problem of individuation or differentiation, as we
saw with Scotus, is one that cannot be resolved by formal or extrinsic
accounts. Surely it is necessary that individual substances have matter
(angels notwithstanding), but in any event the fact of having matter is
not sufficient for their individuation.
For Deleuze, every individual is the actual solution or resolution of a
virtual problem. As Dan Smith argues, it is false, or at least inadequate,
to consider Deleuze an anti-dialectical thinker; rather, he proposes a new
concept of dialectics (Smith 2006: 147). Deleuze writes:
Problems are always dialectical: the dialectic has no other sense, nor do
problems have any other sense . . . it must be said that there are mathematical,
physical, biological, psychical and sociological problems, even though every
problem is dialectical and there are no non-dialectical problems. (Deleuze
1994: 179)
Dialectics is the art of problems, or of problematic Ideas; and as an art, it
is compelled in its movement no less than science by a strict necessity – in
fact, by a principle of sufficient reason. In his lectures on Leibniz,
Deleuze argues that the difference between cause and reason comes
down, once again, to the distinction between condition and genesis, or
between extrinsic and intrinsic relations of determination:
Cause is never sufficient. One must say that the principle of causality poses
a necessary cause, but never a sufficient one. We must distinguish between
necessary cause and sufficient reason . . . sufficient reason expresses the
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relation of a thing with its own notion, whereas cause expresses the relation
of the thing with something else. (Deleuze 1980)
The ‘problematic’, which Deleuze defines as the ‘ensemble of the
problem and its conditions’, is a virtual multiplicity in which the
relations between the undetermined, determinable, and completely
determined particular to it are intrinsic, thus constituting a principle of
sufficient reason.
Differential calculus, according to Deleuze, provides a model for
such a problematic or dialectical Idea – although it does not constitute
an archetype or analogy, and it does not even express the exclusive
formulation of the mathematical Idea. It is a question of exhibiting the
necessary moments of the process of differentiation which constitute its
sufficient reason:
The symbol dx appears as simultaneously undetermined, determinable and
determination. Three principles which together form a sufficient reason
correspond to these three aspects: a principle of determinability corresponds
to the undetermined as such (dy, dx); a principle of reciprocal determination
corresponds to the reciprocally determinable ( dydx ); a principle of complete
determination corresponds to the effectively determined (values of dydx ). In
short, dx is the Idea – the Platonic, Leibnizian or Kantian Idea, the ‘problem’
and its being. (Deleuze 1994: 177)
For a given function f (x), dx represents the ‘rate of change’ of the x
value. In relation to x alone, dx is completely undetermined – nothing
about the x value indicates anything about the rate at which the value
changes, and at any given point dx literally does not exist; and the
same holds for dy solely in relation to y. However, ‘they are perfectly
determinable in relation to one another. For this reason, a principle
of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as such’ (Deleuze
1994: 171). As Hegel noted in the wonderful Remark on infinite quantity
in the Science of Logic, in the differential dydx the two terms are only
‘moments’ of a process, and have sense as determinable only in relation
to one another (Hegel 2010: 215; cf. Deleuze 2006: 182). Deleuze argues
therefore that the principle of reciprocal determinability is not extrinsic
to, but is entailed by, the very nature of the undetermined.
Moreover, in this passage from the undetermined to reciprocal
determination, according to Deleuze, we have also passed from
quantitability to qualitability. Leibniz’s method for finding the derivative
invoked ‘infinitesimals’, infinitely small quantities, which traverse an
ideal distance and at the limit vanish entirely, such that, based on his
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the secant becomes identical
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to the tangent (Leibniz 1989: 545–6). Although this approach yielded
consistent and accurate results experimentally, until the middle of
the nineteenth century it was considered methodologically illegitimate;
much of the controversy about the legitimacy of these methods
came down to a concern over the validity of mathematical concepts
derived from geometric intuition, and in particular about the geometric
intuitions of continuous spatial magnitudes and their infinite divisibility
(Boyer 1959: 190–6, 224–9). Marx, in his mathematical manuscripts,
even refers to this as the ‘mystical’ variant of the differential calculus,
whose procedures were not justified by rigorous mathematics but
were rather accepted because the experimental results were known in
advance (Marx 1983: 3, 91–4). While Deleuze is similarly sceptical
about geometric intuition, unlike mathematicians such as Cauchy and
Weierstrass, who sought to eliminate any trace of these concepts
from mathematics, he nevertheless seeks to retain the concept of
continuousness as ‘the pure element of quantitability, which must be
distinguished both from the fixed quantities of intuition [quantum] and
from variable quantities in the form of concepts of the understanding
[quantitas]’ (Deleuze 1994: 171). Reversing the classical order, he argues
that this continuity is grounded by, rather than grounding, the limit
as a ‘genuine cut [coupure], a border between the changeable and the
unchangeable within the function itself’ (Deleuze 1994: 172).
When we find the derivative of a function f (x), we obtain a new
function: dydx f (x) or f
′(x). But between these two functions there is a
difference which is no longer simply quantitative, but rather qualitative,
insofar as the functions necessarily have different powers. Here again
Deleuze’s analysis echoes that of Hegel, who also argued that the
reciprocal relation of dy/dx has an essentially qualitative, rather than
simply quantitative, character (Hegel 2010: 215–28). That is, for
example, there is a qualitative difference between the curve described
by a polynomial function with a power of 2 and the straight line
of its derivative. This is the sense in which Deleuze writes that the
differential relation is determinable in a qualitative form. In the example
we have just given, as with any such example, ‘in so far as it expresses
another quality, the differential relation remains tied to the individual
values or to the quantitative variations corresponding to that quantity’
(Deleuze 1994: 172). However, if we attend to the universal logic
of the differential determination, rather than the particular qualitative
difference exhibited in the example, we discern in this transformation ‘a
pure element of qualitability’ that derives from the principle of reciprocal
determination (Deleuze 1994: 173).
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Figure 1. Singular points on continuous curves. (Source: Reproduced with
permission fromn Simon Duffy (2006) ‘The Mathematics of Deleuze’s
Differential Logic and Metaphysics’, in Simon Duffy (ed.), Virtual
Mathematics: The Logic of Difference, Manchester: Clinamen Press, p. 128.)
The qualitative difference here is, as we said, one of powers; and it is
in this way, Deleuze argues, that we move from the second principle to
the third:
the differential relation presents a third element, that of pure potentiality.
Power is the form of reciprocal determination according to which variable
magnitudes are taken to be functions of one another . . . A principle of
complete determination corresponds to this element of potentiality. (Deleuze
1994: 174–5)
To every power, there corresponds a distribution of singular points
which are completely determined. Simon Duffy offers an illuminating
diagram illustrating what is meant by ‘singular point’ in this context
(Figure 1).16
Singular points, as he writes, are:
points of articulation where the nature of the curve changes or the function
alters its behaviour . . . The differential relation characterises or qualifies not
only the distinctive points which it determines, but also the nature of the
regular points in the immediate neighbourhood of these points. (Duffy 2006:
128)
If we were to take the derivative of the function graphically represented
here, we would obtain a new function with a lower power describing a
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parabola, in which the ‘stationary points’ would become the points at
which the curve passes through the x-axis ( f ′(x) = 0), and the ‘point of
inflection’ would become the parabola’s nadir ( f ′′(x) = 0).
The singular points on their own do not yet constitute the
function – they are not the principium individuationis, although they
provide the coordinates within which the function’s individuation
occurs. It is the distribution of these singular points that is the object
of the principle of complete determination (Deleuze 1994: 175). The
differential establishes not only the singular points, but also how they
involve ‘neighbourhoods’ within which the ideal infinite continuity is
quantitatively determined. In other words, each completely determined
pre-individual singular point ranges over an infinity of ordinary points
within its area of influence: ‘a series of powers with numerical
coefficients surround one singular point, and only one at a time’ (Deleuze
1994: 176). As Dan Smith writes, in this way we obtain a definition
of the individual: ‘one can say of any determination in general (any
“thing”) that it is a combination of the singular and the ordinary: that
is, it is a “multiplicity” constituted by its singular and ordinary points’
(Smith 2012: 56).
It is here, finally, that we return directly to our question about
individuation: the completely determined distribution of such singular
points, as fully real but pre-individual and only actualised through
infinite variations at the level of individual differences, is precisely
the way in which the virtual is not undifferentiated: this constitutes
‘the distinctness of Ideas’ (Deleuze 1994: 176). Deleuze thus develops
the notion of ‘different/ciation’: ‘We call determination of the virtual
content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualization of that
virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation’ (Deleuze
1994: 207). As in Scotus’ renewal of the problem of individuation, all
the difficulty lies in evading the Scylla of affirming actuality (Platonic
realism), and the Charybdis of denying reality (nominalism), when
it comes to the virtual or the common nature. For in both cases,
we are indeed considering something real: ‘The reality of the virtual
consists in the differential elements and relations along with the singular
points which correspond to them . . . far from being undetermined,
the virtual is completely determined’ (Deleuze 1994: 209). This is
the sense in which, as Deleuze argues, the undetermined of the
problematic Idea is nevertheless objectively real, and non-knowledge is




More than a shared affirmation of the ‘univocity of being’ (Deleuze
1994: 35–40), it is the discovery of and rigorous insistence upon
the objective reality and positivity of the undetermined, of the pre-
individual, that constitutes the thread uniting Deleuze and Scotus in
their efforts to think through the problematic of individuation. As
Deleuze writes, the virtual or the Idea is that which must be understood
both as distinct, as the completely determined distribution of singular
points (differentiated); and also as obscure, as not yet actualised or
distinguishable as individuals are (undifferenciated). In this sense, pre-
individual singularities and their distribution possess, as Scotus would
say, a less-than-numeric unity. In describing distinctness-obscurity,
Deleuze likes to refer to Leibniz’s notion of petites perceptions: the
sound of a crashing wave that one hears is actually constituted by
an infinite multiplicity of minute perceptions, a cacophony integrating
the collision of each and every drop of water, of which one is
unconscious and which one is entirely incapable of distinguishing
clearly (Deleuze 1994: 213; Leibniz 1996: 54–7). The astonishing thing
is that these indistinguishable infinitesimals might be contracted into
an individual – that somehow less-than-numeric unity or pre-individual
reality is occasionally actualised. But the astonishing character of this
integration or contraction should force us to ask after the individual’s
sufficient reason, not to posit an abstract possibility of its contingent
existence. With this insight, that of the determinacy of problematics,
the very questions of metaphysics are transformed: no longer ‘what is
this?’ but ‘why this one?’ and even ‘why this now?’ (Deleuze 2004;
Lampert 2011: 1–11, 114–70). And on the basis of this insight and these
transformations, dispensing with the illusion of abstract possibility,
philosophy teaches us to ask after the conditions of intervention not
at the level of actual determinations, but at the virtual level of pre-
individual distributions. For just like all of Scotus’ rejected candidates
for what could constitute the principle of individuation, attempts to
intervene at the level of the already actual always come too late on the
scene.
Notes
1. It may be helpful to explain at the outset why our analysis does not focus on
Deleuze’s usage of the concept of haecceity, which he obviously adapts directly
from Scotus. Scotus develops the notion of haecceitas or ‘thisness’ precisely in
the investigation into the problem of individuation that we explore; a singular
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being’s haecceity is, for Scotus, that positive but indeterminable difference,
what distinguishes it from others but which is nevertheless irreducible to any
particular quality or set of qualities (qualitas or quidditas), since it must be
prior to these. By contrast, when Deleuze uses the language of haecceity, he
explicitly uses it to designate the problem not of individual differentiation but
of impersonal singularisation; that is, he pushes the concept decisively beyond
the limits determined by Scotus’ usage of it, and attempting to compare these
deployments risks confusing the matter and obscuring Deleuze’s philosophical
novelty. Deleuze’s own formulations make this clear. In A Thousand Plateaus,
haecceity names the kind of spatiotemporal individuation proper to concrete
assemblages and affective durations: ‘There is a mode of individuation very
different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the
name haecceity for it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 261; cf. 260–77, 506–8).
But of course, the kind of individuation that Scotus is interested in is precisely
that of persons, subjects, things or substances. Or again, Deleuze writes: ‘The
life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that
releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life . . .
It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularization: a life of pure
immanence . . . The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular
life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken
for no other. A singular essence, a life . . . ’ (Deleuze 2001: 28–9). Suffice it to
say that the concept of haecceitas here is not Scotus’, and it is not clear that
Scotus would even recognise his monstrous Deleuzian progeny in these lines.
Thus Zourabichvili notes that ‘Scotus conceived haecceity as an individuation
of form, whereas Deleuze thinks it as an intensive and evental individuation, as
mobile and communicating’ (Zourabichvili 2012: 127).
2. It might be objected that in later works, such as The Fold, Deleuze walks back
this hostility to the category of the possible. However, his reading of Leibniz’s
‘best of all possible worlds’ undermines this objection: ‘Leibniz in no way
reintroduces a duality that would turn our relative world into the reflection of a
more profound, absolute world; to the contrary, he turns our relative world into
the only existing world, a world that rejects all other possible worlds because
it is relatively “the best”’ (Deleuze 2006: 68). In other words, Deleuze sees in
Leibniz’s concept of incompossibility a critical repudiation of the abstract or
negative concept of indifferent possibility. In fact, this is because, just like in
the case of the virtual, the relation of incompossibility is not simply negative,
and instead involves a complex of positive differences, a completely determined
distribution of singular points: ‘it seems to us that the incompossible is an
original relation in Leibniz, irreducible to any form of contradiction. It is a
difference and not a negation’ (Deleuze 2006: 174).
3. Similar notions can be found in the work of Gilbert Simondon, who with
his concept of ‘metastable states’ as determinate but pre-individual systems
‘suffused with potentials’ clearly influenced Deleuze; and Manuel DeLanda,
whose Deleuzian approach to the philosophy of science invokes ‘phase spaces’
and ‘cascading bifurcations’ in describing processes of individuation (Simondon
1992; DeLanda 2002). Miguel de Beistegui, John Protevi and Alberto Toscano
have all contributed substantially to research on Deleuze’s relationship to the
philosophy and history of the problem of individuation (cf. de Beistegui 2004;
Protevi 2006; Toscano 2006).
4. For example, Spinoza writes in the Preface to Part IV of the Ethics: ‘the eternal
and infinite being, whom we call God, or nature, acts by the same necessity
by which it exists’ (Spinoza 2002: 321). For a thoughtful discussion of this
rhetorical tactic in Spinoza and contemporary philosophers following in his
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footsteps, see Montag’s Althusser and His Contemporaries (Montag 2013:
116). Regarding Deleuze’s concept of inclusive disjunction or the immanent
affirmation of difference, see the Twenty-Fourth Series of the Communication
of Events and the Twenty-Fifth on Univocity in The Logic of Sense, and the
critique of exclusive disjunction as illegitimate or transcendent in Anti-Oedipus
(Deleuze 1990: 172–80; Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 75–84).
5. On the literality of Deleuze’s concepts, their non-metaphoric character,
Zourabichvili’s work is particularly instructive: literality is ‘entirely a question
of the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of the relation between the actual and the
virtual: the representation of a scene versus the trace of a becoming . . . Far
from extolling an obtuse fixation on the literal usage of words, commitment
to literality takes us prior to the distinction between the literal and the
figurative – the plane of immanence or of univocity, where discourse, prey to
its becomings, has little to fear from the “sedentary” minds who take it to
be metaphor’ (Zourabichvili 2012: 162). See also his essays on literality and
Deleuze’s philosophy in La Litteralité et autres essais sur l’art (Zourabichvili
2011).
6. Here and in what follows, we are not particularly concerned with whether Scotus
is accurate or fair in how he presents the positions of his interlocutors, such as
Roger Marston and Henry of Ghent; even if he happens to misrepresent them,
our interest lies in the logic of Scotus’ own arguments.
7. This is the same argument that Spinoza makes in Proposition 5 of the first book
of the Ethics, according to which there cannot be more than one substance with
a given attribute. For if an attribute is what the intellect perceives as constituting
the essence of a thing, and we say that two things are distinct insofar as they
have the same attribute, then we are claiming that we distinguish them from
one another by virtue of the essence they have in common, which is impossible
(Spinoza 2002: 217–18).
8. Every reference to Scotus in what follows will be from this First Part of
Distinction 3 of Book II of the Ordinatio, and thus will be cited by Question
and Paragraph number.
9. The logic of this objection is very close to those raised by Malebranche’s fictional
interlocutor Aristes in his Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, regarding
the conditions for the possibility of generalising concepts, in Dialogues I and II
(Malebranche 1997: 3–30).
10. Again the parallels here with Spinoza are striking. For Spinoza as for Scotus,
negation is insufficient to account for the positive qualities of any given thing.
See, for instance, Ethics I Axiom 3; I P4; I P26–28; III P4–8, etc. For this reason,
we would argue that Hegel’s influential interpretation of Spinozism in the Science
of Logic (Hegel 2010: 61, 74, 87) and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy
(Hegel 1990: 151–64) turns on a problematic misreading of ‘omnis determinatio
est negatio’. On this point we follow Macherey, in particular chapters 1 and 4
of Hegel or Spinoza (Macherey 2011).
11. Deleuze says almost the exact same thing in criticising the Hegelian theory of the
primacy of the negative: ‘It is of the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple
and to affirm difference. As for the negative, this is only the shadow cast upon
the affirmations produced by a problem: negation appears alongside affirmation
like a powerless double, albeit one which testifies to the existence of another
power, that of the effective and persistent problem’ (Deleuze 1994: 267).
12. Scotus’ beautiful critique of this ‘relational’ position amounts to demonstrating
that it is not relational at all, since one of the terms of the relation is completely
static, and so what was supposed to have been a dynamism is anything but.
Following the same logic, we will come to see, according to Deleuze, that it
is not enough to relate dx to x, or dy to y; in these relations the differentials
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are completely undetermined, since x and y are algebraic symbols representing
values that are actually only indifferently determinate; that is, x and y are, in
principle, constants. It is only when we relate the two dynamic variables, dx
and dy, that we find that they are reciprocally determinable (dx/dy), and this
relation is completely determined when its power is conditioned by a distribution
of singular points dx/dy = f ′(x) Deleuze 1994: 172–6).
13. Žižek and Massumi are hardly alone in referring to quantum physics in
discussing Deleuze’s metaphysics; it has become something of a mainstay in the
genre. Such references are often confusing when not confused. Here as elsewhere
Žižek follows the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum physics,
which is by no means the only one, even if it enjoys a hegemonic status today.
But even in terms of this particular interpretation, his presentation is somewhat
misleading; for instance, in his book on Schelling, he suggests that Werner
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is what Niels Bohr’s complementarity ‘is all
about’ (Žižek 2007: 208–13), when in fact uncertainty and complementarity are
competing, incompatible interpretations, and Heisenberg ultimately retracted his
position, ceding to Bohr. For a recent critical analysis of Žižek’s interpretation
and mobilisation of quantum physics in elaborating his Hegelian-Lacanian
ontology, see chapter 7 of Adrian Johnston’s Adventures in Transcendental
Materialism (Johnston 2014: 165–83). For helpful and philosophically robust
introductions to quantum physics and its history, see Feynman 2014; Omnès
1999; Stengers 2010: 3–101; Barad 2007; Prigogine 1980. For a rigorous
and informed polemic against the hegemony of the Copenhagen indeterminist
interpretation in favour of a Bohmian determinist one, see Dürr et al., Quantum
Physics without Quantum Philosophy: ‘Bohmian mechanics is a version of
quantum mechanics that, while expressed in precise mathematical terms, is clear
as physics. Why isn’t it taught? . . . one of the fundamental reasons for the
dismissal seems to be this: Bohmian mechanics is against the spirit of quantum
mechanics. That is, an objective physical description, a return to determinism,
a return to physical clarity clash with the tenets of quantum philosophy’ (Dürr
et al. 2013: 9). For a particularly lucid discussion of the role of quantum field
theory in Deleuzian philosophy, see Plotnitsky 2006.
14. Translation modified. In the English translation the chapter is entitled ‘Ideas and
the Synthesis of Difference’; in the original, Deleuze writes ‘Synthèse idéelle de
la différence’.
15. See also Deleuze’s remarks on the event as concrete individuation in The Fold:
‘Matter, or what fills space and time, offers characters that always determine
its texture as a function of different materials that are part of it. No longer
are these extensions but, as we have seen, intensions, intensities, or degrees. It
is something rather than nothing, but also this rather than that: no longer the
indefinite article, but the demonstrative pronoun’ (Deleuze 2006: 87–8).
16. We are very grateful to Simon Duffy for granting permission to reprint this
diagram.
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